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The paper investigates the “widest cleft”, as Savage put it, between frequencists in the 
foundation of modern statistics: that opposing R.A. Fisher to Jerzy Neyman and Egon 
Pearson. Apart from deep personal confrontation through their lives, these scientists 
could not agree on methodology, on definitions, on concepts and on tools. Their 
premises and their conclusions widely differed and the two groups they inspired 
ferociously opposed in all arenas of scientific debate. 
 
As the abyss widened, with rare exceptions economists remained innocent of this 
confrontation. The introduction of probability in economics occurred in fact after these 
ravaging battles began, even if they were not as public as they became in the 1950s. In 
any case, when Haavelmo, in the 1940s, suggested a reinterpretation of economics 
according to the probability concepts, he chose sides and inscribed his concepts in the 
Neyman-Pearson tradition. But the majority of the profession indifferently used tools 
developed by each of the opposed groups of statisticians, and many puzzled economists 
chose to ignore the debate.  
 
Economics became, as a consequence, one of the experimental fields for 
“hybridization”, a synthesis between Fisherian and Neyman-Pearsonian precepts, 
defined as a number of practical proceedings for statistical testing and inference that 
were developed notwithstanding the original authors, as an eventual convergence 





“But the age of chivalry is gone. 
That of sophisters, economists, 
and calculators, has succeeded; 
and the glory of Europe 
is extinguished for ever.” 







Modernity was, since its inception, a hurricane devastating previous traditions, modes 
of thought, habits and creeds. Its sweep represented as well a loss of innocence for the 
new ages, and this is far clearer in science than in any other domain: looking for facts, 
for causes and for consequences, as an exhaustive quest for quantification and for 
certainty, science superseded all other forms of knowledge and imposed the social 
authority of numbers and experts moved by the superior ideal of control of nature. If a 
book evokes no numbers and experimental reasoning, “commit it then to the flames for 
it contains nothing but sophistry and illusion”, urged Hume (1748: 165). The laments of 
the likes of Edmund Burke against the emergence of modernity and expressing the fear 
of enlightenment could not challenge this movement. 
 
Science was therefore developed as measurement and quantification, as the perception 
of the numbers ruling the universe. The age of chivalry was indeed gone, and the epoch 
of calculators and economists succeeded: mechanics was the name for that knowledge. 
Mechanisms were discovered to rule everything, from the Newtonian cosmic laws to 
geometry, from clocks taming time to motors and other artefacts moving the world. All 
science could not be but mechanistic. Even Darwin’s anti-deterministic The Origin of 
the Species was celebrated by Boltzmann as the introduction of “a mechanical view of 
Nature” (Gigerenzer et al., 1989: 136). 
 
This view was certainly shared by major biologists. For Ronald Aylmer Fisher, one of 
the protagonists of this narrative, evolutionary theory was constructed in analogy with 
statistical mechanics, since evolution by natural selection “may be compared to the 
analytic treatment of the theory of gases, in which it is possible to make the most varied 
assumptions as to the nature of the individual molecules, and yet to develop the general 
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laws as to the behavior of gases” (Fisher, 1922: 324). Fisher’s model of Mendelian 
populations was in fact metaphorised from the molecular models of statistical 
mechanics applied to gases, as he always made clear (Morrison, 2002: 64). 
 
This analytical treatment of such diverse subjects as gases and genes was the function of 
statistics, the modern form of measurement and quantification, that corpus of techniques 
permitting the nomad analogy to travel from the theory of gases to all other domains 
and to impose mechanics as the paradigm. 
  
Statistics, therefore, was the motum for the modern revolution in sciences. But statistics 
developed through time in two different directions. The first was measurement as such, 
with statistics posing as the representation of reality as data gathering. For classical 
mechanics, probability was a condition for measurement since human ignorance 
impinged errors in statistics, and the computation should either clean or at least 
miminize the error abusively superimposed on perfect determination: the error is part of 
the observer. The second direction was, on the contrary, to conceive of probability as 
the expression of the very structure of nature, as quantum mechanics or evolutionary 
biology suggested: the error is part of nature.  
 
This was more difficult to generalise, in particular in social sciences, since it required a 
new conception of human agency and indeed “probability has not been a basic building 
block of scientific theorizing except in physics and in evolutionary biology. (…) 
Economists, for example, construct their theories as if they were mechanical systems; 
yet in applications these theories are given a stochastic representation for the purposes 
of empirical adequacy” (Kruger et al., 1987: 3), and consequently the exact statute of 
the stochastic process is not frequently established in economic models – a theme for 
the last section of this paper. 
 
Modern frequencists, as the probability revolution unfolded under the lead of quantum 
mechanics, shared both the epistemic view of statistics as measurement and the 
ontologic view of the intrinsic stochastic nature of nature. In biology, they were all the 
better prepared to accept both the requirement for measurement and the concept of 
variation, since that was the core of Darwinism. As a consequence, in the 1930s 
evolutionary biology was one of the first sciences to be reconstructed on probabilistic 
foundations. Biologists had therefore the theory, the motivation, the laboratories, the 
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ability to measure and both the possibility and the will to make inferences. And the 
most distinguished of them had also an immense capacity to fight. Evolutionary biology 
became consequently the field of experimentation of new statistical methods and of 
confrontation of different emerging approaches.  
 
The divergences opposing some of the founders of the modern statistics and 
evolutionary biology were epic, “one of the most bitter disputes in science” 
(Keuzenkamp and Magnus, 1995: 10). As Savage put it in a volume edited by Neyman, 
“the widest cleft between frequencists is that between R.A. Fisher and those who side 
closely with him on the one hand and those who more or less associate themselves with 
the school of Jerzy Neyman and Egon Pearson” (Savage, 1961: 577). The two groups 
opposed on almost everything, from the concept of scientific inference to the definition 
of statistics. 
 
Yet, this was not necessarily the only possible destiny of their conversation. In fact, 
both Fisher and Neyman felt the vocation to supersede Karl Pearson’s heritage in 
statistics: the former was a personal adversary of Pearson, and the second underrated his 
mathematical capacities and, although less outspoken given his cooperation with Karl’s 
son, Egon, did never hide the feeling that a new start was required (Louçã, 2007). For a 
time, this provided motivation for convergence between both men. 
 
When trying to move to Western Europe to enhance his academic opportunities and to 
avoid danger in those frightful 1930s, the Polish Jerzy Neyman corresponded with 
Fisher, only four years his elder, believing he was the man to help him. They were 
indeed quite close in the vision of statistics as the language for the new science to rule 
all other sciences. Gosset, a friend of both, emphasised their motivational vicinity when 
he wrote to Fisher in order to arrange for the visit of Neyman to Rothamstead: “He is 
fonder of algebra than correlation tables [meaning, against Karl Pearson] and is the only 
person except yourself I have heard talk about maximum likelyhood (sic) as if he 
enjoyed it” (quoted in Joan Fisher, 1978: 451). 
 
A curious letter in 1932 presents some preliminary results by Neyman, claiming “these 
results [to be] in splendid disagreement with the last articles of Professor Pearson”, 
certainly a conclusion meant to please Fisher. The suggested best tests “guarantee the 
minimum frequency of errors both in rejecting the true hypothesis and in accepting a 
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false one”, an anticipation of the line of research Neyman was then following with Egon 
Pearson (Neyman to Fisher, 9 February 1932). Neyman insisted on the opportunity for 
working under Fisher’s guidance: “I am often thinking that it would be very useful for 
me to work in contact with you. Unfortunately this requires considerable amount of 
money – without speaking of your consent – of course” and later asked again for a 
place.1 
 
The opportunity to leave Poland only presented later, and it was Egon Pearson who 
managed to get a job for his co-author, who came in 1934 to University College, 
London, to find Fisher segregated in a different floor and department. There is evidence 
that, at first, they got along well enough.2 Neyman presented a paper in 1934 phrasing 
his proposal of confidence intervals as a reformulation of Fisher’s fiducial argument, 
and the latter was “ironically one of the few to comment favourably on Neyman’s 
paper”, although criticising him for the limited inferential value since not using all 
available information (Zabell, 1992: 374).  
 
Yet, the following year their relation broke and the pretext was the discussion on 
Neyman’s paper on agricultural experiments. The clash was violent, as the flourished 
rhetorical bombardments witness and, as Fisher mounted his attack on Neyman, Egon 
Person came to the rescue of his co-author, accusing Fisher of nothing less than 
ignorance, after Neyman having been accused of the same sin.3 
 
But by that time the “widest cleft” was already deep enough and, when in 1938 Neyman 
moved to Berkeley and was in position to otherwise influence the development of his 
                                                 
1 Neyman to Fisher, 28 October 1932 and 13 June 1933. When he approached Fisher for a job, Neyman 
had already developed and published with Egon Pearson the first building-blocks of his own theory of 
estimation. It is obvious he did not consider that to be in contradiction with Fisher’s ideas. Fisher 
highlighted this connection as he accepted, even when the quarrel was installed, that “For several years it 
is certain that Neyman thought, in speaking of ‘confidence-intervals, that he was only systematising and 
developing a new exposition appropriate to the fiducial argument I had put forward and pressed upon his 
notice” (Fisher to M.G. Kendall, 3 November 1943). 
2 Neyman’s biographers state that “Initially Fisher was gracious and Neyman admiring, but they soon 
came into conflict” (Lehmann and Reid, 1982: 161). Joan Fisher declares that Neyman, after a short 
period of peace, “sniped” at her father since the 1935 debate (Fisher, 1978: 262-3). 
3 Fisher on Neyman: “I suggest that before criticizing previous work it is always wise to give enough 
study to the subject to understand its purpose”. Pearson on Fisher, speaking in defence of Neyman: “Dr. 
Pearson said while he knew that there was a widespread belief in Professor Fisher’s infallibility, he must, 
in the first place, beg leave to question the wisdom of accusing a fellow worker of incompetence without, 
at the same time, showing that he had succeeded in mastering the argument” (minutes of the discussion, 
in Neyman, 1935: 202). 
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science, the offences of the civil war in statistics were numerous.4 Neyman himself later 
addressed this topic in a paper on the “Silver Jubilee” of his quarrel with Fisher, 
although presenting an unfairly biased account of the confrontation.5 
 
It is interpretative and therefore highly subjective and impossible to establish the 
complete set of personal reasons for the opposition between these scientists. Some clues 
are given in the correspondence by Fisher to some colleagues, but no uncontroversial 
reason can be identified as the main cause for this malaise. Fisher, who “sometimes 
became an irascible protagonist” (Bennett, 1990: vii), accused Neyman of using his own 
work without reference,6 but still this would imply their theories to be related, a claim 
both vehemently denied. In any case, the confrontation grew exponentially, to the point 
of reference to “mad Neymanians in California”,7 to people “being ‘bawled down’ by 
Neymanians”, who were supposed to “intimidate Americans successfully enough, 
especially refugees anxious to get posts in American Universities”,8 since “Neyman is, 
judging by my own experience, a malicious mischief-maker. Probably by now this is 
sufficiently realised in California. I would not suggest to anyone to engage in scientific 
controversy with him, for I think that scientific discussion is only profitable when good 
faith can be assumed in the common aim of getting at the truth”,9 all this from a man 
who candidly confessed “averse to controversy in print or in letters”.10  
 
Neyman retorted in the same measure, simply accusing his opponent of incompetence: 
“the theory of fiducial inference is simply non-existent in the same way as, for example, 
a theory of numbers defined by mutually contradictory definitions” (Neyman, 1941: 
149). 
 
                                                 
4 It is to be noted that Egon Pearson ceased the intense collaboration he had with Neyman since the latter 
moved to the US. 
5 Neyman argued that Fisher intensely persecuted his views through his entire career, but this description 
is wrong. This could only be true as far as the animosity between both men led to a campaign of private 
letters mixing disdain and argument; but Fisher only twice criticised his opponents in public until the 
1955 book although from then he did not stop (Zabell, 1992: 376). It is certainly true to say that, in this 
story, neither side spared the other. 
6 Fisher often suggested that Neyman and Pearson had taken from him their theory of inference and 
confidence intervals “and proceeded to expound it to the world with the minimum reference to its origin” 
(Fisher to M.G. Kendall, 9 but also 2 November 1942, just as he had wrote to W.A. Shewhart, 2 February 
1940). 
7 Fisher to D.D.A. Sprott, 13 January 1962. 
8 Fisher to D.A.S. Fraser, 11 January 1962. 
9 Fisher to H. Gray, 2 July 1951. 
10 Fisher to G.S. James, 16 August 1955. 
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In any case, as powerful as he was in theory making and in practice and teaching, Fisher 
was confronted with the vigorous success of the Neyman-Pearson method. One of his 
friends, G.A. Barnard, who was the vice-president the Royal Statistical Society under 
Fisher’s presidency, noted that his antagonists were fashionable enough: 
 
If I may say so, it has for a long time struck me that Neyman and Pearson’s ideas 
have caught on widely, because they are based on an explicit theory of 
probability (the neo-classical theory), and they are therefore more easily put in 
‘clear’ mathematical language than your own ideas. (…) As far as I know (and I 
should be very grateful for correction), your own ideas on probability, as distinct 
from statistical testing, have not been set out explicitly in a complete form. (G.A. 
Barnard to Fisher, 14 October 1945) 
 
Much later, Barnard still complained in the same sense: “almost everyone agrees with 
your criticisms of Neyman and Jeffreys, and with at least a part of your general theory. 
But nearly all become highly convoluted because (I think) their mathematical training 
has followed the now fashionable trend towards axiomatics to such an extent as to make 
them sometimes incapable of following a semantic argument”.11 As Barnard noticed, 
the explicit support of the Neyman-Pearson technology on a theory of probability and 
its axiomatics propelled it to large audiences.12 In fact, this gained Neyman a large 
support that Fisher was wrong to undervalue. As Seidenfeld put it, “by the end of World 
War II the overwhelming majority of practising statisticians took it [Neyman-Pearson’s 
theory] as the received position” (Seidenfeld, 1979: 30), and others state that “at the 
formal level Neyman and Pearson seem to have won the battle with Fisher” 
(Keuzenkamp and Magnus, 1995: 13). But Fisher had weapons to oppose his 
adversaries and did not hesitate to fight back.  
 
The temptation to explain this confrontation through the idiosyncrasies of the 
contenders frequently emerged. Indeed, in particular the personal characteristics of 
Fisher generated a legend, and it was not without reason. His daughter and biographer, 
Joan Fisher Box, wrote that “He grew up without developing a sensitivity to the 
ordinary humanity of his fellows. He was unaware of the effects of his own behavior, 
and often expressed his love ineptly”. Furthermore, “He was at once exceedingly self-
                                                 
11 Barnard to Fisher, 27 February 1958. 
12 In contrast, Fisher either neglected the “continental” work on axiomatics (Bartlett, 1965: 407) or 
distasted it (Zabell, 1992: 387). 
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centered and utterly self-forgetful, charming and impossible. And his friends learned to 
accept his inconsiderate and irritable behavior because they perceived the greatness of 
his character”, in spite of the fact that “He would ‘fly off the handle’ for not apparent 
reason and was fiercely intolerant of petty inconveniences. His anger was 
unpredictable” (Joan Fisher, 1978: 10, 12, 170).  
 
Karl Pearson, one of his opponents, accepted he was an “apt controversialist” (Pearson, 
quoted in Inman, 1994: 6), and Neyman emphasised “Fisher’s remarkable talent in 
polemics” (Neyman, 1956: 292), although the younger Bartlett – who was another 
fighter in these early skirmishes – was less measured, noticing he had been “downright 
rude” and “did not argue fairly” against Neyman and Pearson, to conclude that “The 
trouble with great men, especially those with temperaments of comparable stature, is 
that they are liable to excite either allegiance or rebellion” (Bartlett, 1965: 397, 408). 
For Savage, Fisher “sometimes published insults that only a saint could entirely 
forgive” and added “I am surely not alone in having suspected that some of Fisher’s 
major views were adopted simply to avoid agreeing with his opponents” (Savage, 1976: 
446). In the same mood, Mackenzie registered his “extreme egocentricity and violent 
temper” (Mackenzie, 1981: 184). In any case, Fisher certainly impressed by animosity 
and imposing attitude, namely his “English spoken in a Shakespearean style and 
delivered in the manner of a Spanish grandee” (Hoyle, 1999). 
 
However relevant these personal characteristics may have been, the nature of the debate 
about the foundations of statistics invites for a balanced assessment of the very 




Ravaging battles between R.A. Fisher 
and Jerzy Neyman-Egon Pearson 
 
 
R.A. Fisher’s best selling books13 and acclaimed papers were the driving force for a 
major dislocation of the themes of statistics: instead of the correlation established 
between variables describing large populations in a causeless world, in the mood of 
Karl Pearson, under Fisher rigorous protocols of experimentation, randomisation and 
modelling were defined, allowing for sampling and inference. Among Fisher’s major 
contributions, one can count the analysis of variance and the definition of the concept of 
maximum likelihood.14 As a consequence, statistics gained both a solid mathematical 
basis and an experimental reference imposing its authority.  
 
This process of transformation was intensely disturbed when the “widest cleft” was 
declared. There was a “negative impact upon science from the disagreement” and it 
“had a significantly deleterious effect upon the practice of statistics in science, 
essentially because it has led to widespread confusion” (Berger, 2003: 2, 4).  
 
This widespread confusion was to be expected since, as their investigations proceeded, 
Fisher and Neyman-Pearson generated successive domains of confrontation spreading 
over all the major topics of statistics. One of the protagonists, Egon Pearson, 
appreciated these shocks as harmful blows to statistics: “The titanic battles which have 
from time to time been waged across the statistical field were perhaps enlivening to the 
onlookers, but they were very real and I think harmfully moving to the participants” 
(Pearson, 1968: 456). 
 
Let me state some of the differences of practical application, as both Fisher and 
Neyman-Pearson proposed their concepts (Table 1), before appreciating their rationale. 
                                                 
13 The first book, “Statistical Methods for Research Workers” was initially ignored by the peers but 
acclaimed by the researchers: “it did not receive a single good review” (Joan Fisher, 1978: 130) and yet it 
became a bestseller. 
14 Not to mention another of his contributions, a relevant one for a new born science: the definition of 
operational concepts, which are now trivial, such as “parameters”, to “specify the parent population”, and 
statistic, “calculated from the observed sample” (Fisher to W.E. Deming, 25 September 1934). 
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1. the information is an extraction from 
an infinite hypothetical population 
2. the statistics is a property of the 
sample 
Procedure: 
1.    state the null, H0 
3. specify the test statistic T and its 
distribution under H0 being true 
4. apply to data and calculate T  
5. determine the p-value corresponding 
to T under the assumption of H0 being 
true 




1. the test is conceived of as a frequency 
obtained from repeated sampling 
2. size and power are properties of the test 
 
Procedure: 
1.   state the null H0, and the alternative  HA 
3. specify T and its distribution under Ho 
4. specify the significance level α and 
define the rejection region R under H0 
5. apply to data and determine T 
6. reject H0 and accept HA if T is in R 
 
 
The application of these methodologies can deliver very different conclusions in some 
cases. Berger proposes the following example: suppose {X1… XN} are iid from N(µ, σ) 
with known variance, n=10, and we test H0:µ=0 versus HA:µ#0. If z=2,3 (or z=2.9), then 
Fisher would report p=0,021 (or p=0,0037) and Neyman, prescribing an error Type I of 
0,05, would report α=0,05 in either case (Berger, 2003: 1). Other authors suggest 
otherwise that the methods are generally equivalent: “For it turned out that both 
methods were mathematically equivalent. The tail area is, for the usual choices of 
alternative hypothesis, nothing more than the projections of a rejection region on the 
real line, and can be justified on the grounds of avoiding an error of the first kind. 
Furthermore, it turns out that many Fisherian choices of a test statistics are equivalent to 
a choice of an alternative hypothesis” (Gigerenzer et al., 1989: 99-100). In any case, 
either confusion is the result of these alternative presentations of testing, or divergence 
in conclusions challenges the rigour and objectivity of statistics, both implications being 
highly undesirable. 
 
In spite of the impacts of the cleft on the general perception of the ability of statistical 
science, both sides proved to be unrepentant. Indeed, Fisher always rejected the core 
concepts of the Neyman-Pearson approach: the notion of error of the second kind, the 
idea of repeated samples from the same population and, moreover, the behavioristic 
approach to induction – acceptance of the alternative hypothesis being obtained through 
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rejection of the null. Alternatively, Neyman argued that Fisher had no logical basis for 
the choice of his test statistics and that it did not obey the frequencist criteria. 
 
These divergences are recapitulated below in three sections. The first deals with the 
theory of induction and its foundations, while the second evaluates the views on 
refutation and confirmation and the third discusses the concepts of models and 
experiments. In each case, the cleft is reassessed and the views of both camps are 
compared.  
 
The final result of the cleft is yet to be established. Some scholars argue that “At the 
formal level Neyman and Pearson seen to have won the battle with Fisher”, in spite of 
the fact that econometric practice seems to follow Fisher rather than Neyman and 
Pearson: “But how often is the question that an econometrician has to answer a decision 
problem in the context of repeated sampling? Fisher’s interpretation of a small P-value 
(which follows the tradition of Laplace to K. Pearson), that either something very 
unlikely has happened or the null is false, may be more useful in econometric practice” 
(Keuzenkamp and Magnus, 1995: 13, 18). 
 
2.1. The first difference: the theory of induction 
 
Probability, as the heart of statistical theory, is since its origins predicated upon a theory 
of induction. The success of R.A. Fisher’s methods was precisely based on his 
contribution to the definition of statistical induction as a model of scientific inference 
itself and in that sense he stood almost alone among his contemporaries. Fisher was 
philosophically committed to the Laplacean ambition of a statistical redescription of a 
fully deterministic world, and he singled out as one of the few capable of providing the 
arguments for this ambitious scientism. The history of Fisher’s adherence to the modern 
views on statistical inference is consequently very relevant for this narrative.  
 
In the scholar year of 1912-3, having been granted a studentship in physics, Fisher 
dedicated his graduate research in Cambridge to study quantum mechanics with the 
physicist James Jeans and the theory of errors with F.J.M. Stratton. As Joan Fisher 
summarizes, as a consequence he accepted the divulgation of Heisenberg’s principle of 
uncertainty in the 1930s as a natural implication of physics, unlike other scientists 
(Fisher, 1978: 33, 290).  
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From that time and through his whole life as he was exposed to biological 
experimentation and statistical inference, his heroes were the improbable pair of Darwin 
and Boltzmann (Depew and Weber, 1996: 246). From Boltzmann, Fisher concluded that 
probabilities were an objective feature of the world, unrelated to subjective states of 
mind; consequently, statistics should be able to decipher the natural laws and not just to 
point out the omnipresence of stochasticity (Depew and Weber 1996: 254, 272). 
Boltzmann and quantum mechanics, provided the methods, as Fisher unreluctantly 
emphasised: “the whole investigation may be compared to the analytical treatment of 
the Theory of Gases, in which it is possible to make the most varied assumptions as to 
the accidental circumstances, and even the essential nature of individual molecules, and 
yet to develop the general laws as to the behavior of gases” (Fisher, 1922: 321-2). 
 
It is obvious Fisher was conceiving this analytical treatment not as forces in action, but 
as the physics of energy, namely fitness being the equivalent to entropy: 
 
It will be noticed that the Fundamental Theorem (…) bears some remarkable 
resemblances to the Second Law of Thermodynamics. Both are properties of 
populations, or aggregates, true irrespective of the nature of the units which 
compose them; both are statistical laws; each requires the constant increase of a 
measurable quantity, in the one case the entropy of a physical system and in the 
other the fitness (…) of a biological population. (Fisher, 1930: 36-7, my italics)  
 
Fitness, like entropy, was consequently measured as part of a dynamic maximization 
process tending to a most probable distribution, its equilibrium (Depew and Weber, 
1996: 262). As quantum physics suggests, these measures are supposed to be qualities 
of the populations: in that sense, Fisher was the biologist whose propositions were akin 
to the Boltzmannian approach. In that he differed from J.B.S. Haldane, who looked for 
the modification in one single gene, to be amplified in the population, whereas for 
Fisher only the dynamics of arrays of genes in the population mattered.  
 
The concept of population therefore became a cornerstone of the introduction of 




2.1.1. The concept of population 
 
 
The probabilistic revolution entered in biology as the Mendelian reconfiguration of 
Darwinism, and Fisher was instrumental to that synthesis. Indeed, after a generation of 
heated confrontation between biometricians and Mendelians, a convergence was 
obtained, and that was the result of proof via statistics. Evidence shows that, at least for 
Fisher, the synthesis in biology incorporated the benefits from an education in quantum 
physics, namely in the definition of probability itself. For Fisher, as he stated in an early 
statement, biological populations were conceived as an analogy with the populations of 
atoms in gas theory, following the approach of the molecular models of statistical 
mechanics in order to define variation at the level of Mendelian characters and not at the 
level of the phenotypes (Fisher and Stock, 1915). 
 
In this sense, Fisher imposed the notion of data as being drawn from an infinite and 
therefore imagined population as the condition for statistical inference from an 
experiment: 
 
The object is accomplished by constructing a hypothetical infinite population, of 
which the actual data are regarded as constituting a random sample. The law of 
distribution of this hypothetical population is specified by relatively few 
parameters, which are sufficient to describe it exhaustively in respect of all 
qualities under discussion. (Fisher, 1922: 311) 
 
A simple example argues for this notion of an infinite population: 
  
The idea of an infinite hypothetical population is, I believe, implicit in all 
statements involving mathematical probability. If, in a Mendelian experiment, 
we say that the probability is one half that a mouse born in a certain mating shall 
be white, we must conceive of our mouse as one of an infinite population of 
mice which might have been produced by that mating. The population must be 
infinite for in sampling from a finite population the fact of one mouse being 
white would affect the probability of others being white, and this is not in the 
hypothesis we wish to consider (…). Being infinite the population is clearly 
hypothetical (…). (Fisher, 1950: 699) 
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Both the concept of population and the definition of a model to interpret it fuelled the 
main early confrontations between Fisher and the elder Pearson. Karl Pearson strongly 
rejected Mendelism, since his radical positivism denied any theoretical entity such as a 
gene and favoured instead an acausal and purely descriptive strategy for biology. Yet, 
the core of his divergence with Fisher was the definition and model of a population: 
“The dispute between Pearson and Fisher centred on how populations should be 
characterised with respect to the individuals they comprise” (Morrison, 2002: 62). 
Indeed, Fisher’s path-breaking contribution to the synthesis between Mendelism and 
Darwinism was precisely the notion of demonstration of natural selection operating in 
Mendelian populations, and his analysis of variance was conceived as a determination 
of the distinctive genetic and environmental influences. 
 
Karl Pearson strongly opposed to the concept of an infinite population, something his 
positivism could not accept in any case; instead, for Fisher, the specification of an 
infinite and hypothetical population was the condition to infer the parameters of the 
model.15 Consequently, statistics could not live without the concept of the infinite 
population. It could not come as a surprise if Fisher bombarded Neyman and the 
younger Pearson with the same argument he was so proud to differentiate him from 
Karl Pearson since the successful beginning of his career. 
 
As the story unfolded, it became clear that it was due to these essential philosophical 
anxieties, namely coherence with the Boltzmannian concepts of probability, that Fisher 
opposed Neyman and Pearson about their concept of repeated samples, which was 
clearly in contradistinction with his own notion of information as an extraction from a 
population. 
 
Although the background in theoretical physics and statistics of this debate was not 
invoked by the contenders, it is not without importance. In fact, physics was at the time 
of the formation of Fisher’s and Neyman’s approaches evolving from statistical 
mechanics (probability being applied to aggregates of elements and systems, measured 
as relative frequencies) to quantum mechanics (also extended to the probability of 
behaviour of a single element). Furthermore, Maxwell had introduced the ergodic 
                                                 
15 The definition of probability was postulated in relation to the infinite hypothetical population: “the 
probability that an event e has property F is p1 iff e is known to belong to a reference class of ‘possible 
events’ with proportion p1 having property F, and such that no subset of this reference class having 
different proportions for F-ness is known, i.e. no recognizable subset is known. Under these conditions, e 
is said to be a random sample (or random member) from a hypothetical reference class with respect to the 
property F” (Seidenfeld, 1979: 73). 
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hypothesis, following Boltzmann, considering that a system in equilibrium assumes all 
states compatible with the conservation of energy, and promoting as a consequence an 
“ensemble approach” studying the population of possible systems distributed over all 
states compatible with the observed magnitudes, as Gibbs summarised it. The concept 
of population of possible events referred therefore to this epistemic interpretation of 
probability as the chance of finding the one event under scrutiny, an interpretation put 
forward by Fisher. Working in this frontier of the theory of errors inspired by 
Boltzmann and the “ensemble approach”, Fisher felt secured by the coherence of this 
approach he was championing in statistical biology. 
 
2.1.2. Laplace between Fisher and Neyman  
 
A peculiar aspect of the “widest cleft” was the vindication of the authority of the fathers 
of statistics. Both groups of contenders frequently referred to the work of ancestors in 
order to reinforce their points, so that Laplace and Gosset were frequently quoted in 
their arguments and counter-arguments. Egon Pearson used a letter by “student”, alias 
Gosset, to argue the pertinacity of the tests of hypotheses, but it was about Laplace that 
the dispute turned bitter. 
 
Indeed, both sides had strong points. For Fisher, and he was right on that, Neyman and 
Pearson had abandoned the Laplacean pretence of a theory of induction, and therefore 
of a general method for scientific inference. In fact, Neyman rejected Fisher’s 
programme of disproving the null as the basis for inductive inference, and instead 
argued for an inductive behaviour using the test of hypothesis as a decision rule (Kruger 
et al., 1987: 18; Gigerenzer et al, 1989: 207; Keuzenkamp and Magnus, 1995: 10). 
Consequently, Fisher “believed Neyman had mistakenly reinterpreted his tests of 
significance in terms of acceptance procedures, an ideological point of view that valued 
expediency over truth” (Gigerenzer et al, ibid.: 104). 
 
The direct probability statement produced by Fisher was challenged by Neyman and 
Pearson, who preferred a model of decision, an acceptance procedure that was part of 




Nevertheless, Neyman and Pearson considered that this was the price for fidelity, since 
a pure frequencist approach ought to sacrifice the philosophical pretence to the 
statistical convenience. The repeated sampling approach, according to them a condition 
to interpret the tests of hypotheses as probability statements, was considered to be the 
rationale for statistical decision: “Without consideration of hypotheses alternative to the 
one under test and without the study of probabilities of errors of the two kinds, no 
purely probabilistic theory of tests is possible” (Neyman, 1956: 288). In fact, Neyman – 
who was obviously the leading theoricist of this cooperation with Pearson – accused 
Fisher of subjectivism given his supposition of a hypothetical population, and 
furthermore suspected Fisher of abandoning a strict frequencist attitude for the sake of 
his design of scientific inference, and in that he was right. And so he could turn the 
accusation and vindicate Laplace: since Fisher denounced Neyman, Pearson, Wald and 
Bartlett “allegedly based on an attitude identifying ordinary research with industrial 
acceptance sampling”, i.e. on the basis of the repeated sampling interpretation, Neyman 
could present a quotation from Laplace sustaining his views on that topic (ibid.: 293).16 
 
Apart from this dispute on the borrowed credibility of a respected founder of statistics, 
the reference to Laplace highlights other difficulties shared by both Fisher and Neyman.  
 
The first is related to the nature of the frequencist view. Indeed, although both the 
behaviouristic and the inductive model of inference were relative to an imaginary 
framework – since Fisher’s population was as imaginary as Neyman’s repeated 
sampling procedure17 – Fisher could claim his method led to a direct probability 
statement, since his test was a property of the sample, whereas the operational concepts 
of size and power defined by Neyman and Pearson were conditional on the test itself.18 
                                                 
16 Hacking supports Neyman’s claim on the precedence of Laplace in the theory of hypothesis testing, 
given his emphasis on the importance of a rival hypothesis, and argues that Fisher “was wrong in this 
respect” (Hacking, 1964: 16). 
17 Fisher denounced the “fallacious approach to tests of significance introduced by Neyman and Pearson, 
and usually expressed in such phrases as, ‘the frequency found in repeated samples from the same 
population’. (…) I have only realised recently (…) to what extent Neyman and Pearson’s approach, 
including this question of ‘repeated samples from the same population’, is due to their thinking of a test 
of significance as though it were a kind of acceptance procedure in which the repeated samples have an 
objective reality, and are not, as they are with tests of significance, constructs of the statistician’s 
imagination” (Fisher to H.F. Smith, 27 August 1954). 
18 Gigerenzer and his co-authors discuss the frequencist interpretation to the claim of repeated sampling 
and the contradiction with Fisher’s views: “Second, [for Neyman and Pearson] the frequencies of the 
errors of the first and second kind are calculated on the basis of repeated sampling of the distributions in 
the original mathematical specification of the problem, and the probabilities have therefore a direct 
frequency interpretation (…). Recall Fisher’s belief that, in scientific applications, the population of the 
appropriate statistical model for the analysis of experimental data cannot in any realistic sense be sampled 
 17
From that Fisher concluded that “in the end Neyman denies the possibility of making 
any probability statement about the natural facts behind the observations”.19 
 
The second difficulty is related to the very concept of probability. It is obvious Fisher 
was unease with the limiting frequency interpretation of probability, since it supports no 
proposition on a specific fact, for instance it allows for no statement of probability of a 
particular throw of dice (Seidenfeld, 1979: 71). Fisher argued that probability 
statements are only a peculiar class of strictly mathematical specifications, not to be 
generalised to all cases of inference from observations: 
 
From my point of view the important point is that the original concept of 
probability is not adequate to specify the nature of uncertainty inherent in many 
forms of inference from observations. From this point of view it is almost 
unfortunate that a group of cases has been found in which inductive inference 
may properly be expressed in terms of probability, using the fiducial mode of 
argument; for this has tempted some mathematicians, and will, I fear, tempt 
more, to imagine that this type of argument is more widely applicable than is 
really the case, and to avoid enlarging their imagination sufficiently to grasp the 
cases where no probability statement is adequate. This is, in my view, a decisive 
reason against enlarging the meaning of the theory of probability so as to cover 
all types of inductive inference, since the word ‘probability’ must be tied closely 
to one quite defined mathematical concept.” (Fisher to A.C. Aitken, 23 January 
1936) 
 
This view he maintained through all his life work: 
 
I have reiterated repeatedly that the concept of mathematical probability is 
inadequate to express the nature and extent of our uncertainty in the face of 
certain types of observational material, while in all cases the concept of 
mathematical likelihood will supply very helpful guidance, if we are prepared to 
                                                                                                                                               
repeatedly, and has ‘no objective reality, being exclusively the product of the statistician’s imagination’” 
(Gigerenzer et al, 1989: 103). Moreover, “In place of what Neyman and Pearson saw as Fisher’s quasi-
Bayesian view that the exact level of significance somehow measures the discordance of data with the 
null hypothesis, their interpretation of statistical inference was a purely behavioristic one that refrained 
from any epistemic interpretation. The concept of size and power apply to a test, whereas Fisher’s 
significance level is a property of the sample” (ibid.). 
19 Fisher to Finney, 24 March 1955. 
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give up our irrational urge to express ourselves only in terms of mathematical 
probability. (Fisher to D.J. Finney, 14 September 1954) 
 
This profound scepticism perplexed many of his contemporaries. Jeffreys, a leading 
Bayesian, questioned Fisher on the generalisation of probability statements,20 and E.B. 
Wilson was tutored on the relevance of Keynes’s concept of “the degree of rational 
belief” for those cases “from which no statement of probability can be derived”.21 The 
reason for this attitude was not mistrust in statistics but, on the contrary, a commitment 
to the role statistics should play as a rigorous instrument for scientific inference. This 
was precisely the reason for imposing the experimental nature of the probability 
statements:  
 
In the first place you seem to express surprise at my belief that ‘statements of 
probability can be verified by observational frequencies’. It would have been 
more explicit had I said ‘statements of probability in the Natural Sciences’ or 
‘statements of probability referring to the real world’ (…). In the second place 
you do not seem to grasp the central characteristic of the concept of 
mathematical probability, namely that it enables a statement of uncertainty to be 
made with rigorous exactitude. This requires a specification not only of what is 
known, or can be validly asserted on the data, but also of what is unknown, in 
order that the probability statement should be distinguishable from a statement 
of certainty. (Fisher to J. Tukey, 18 July 1955) 
 
Of course, these observational frequencies obtained from investigation in natural 
sciences did not apply, according to Fisher, to the tests of hypotheses as suggested by 
                                                 
20 When Jeffreys questioned him, since “I cannot follow your objection to the generalization to all 
probabilities of the laws of probability obtained for samples” (H. Jeffreys to Fisher, 24 February 1934), 
Fisher retorted: “I do not object to the generalization to all probabilities of the laws appropriate to the 
games of chance, but I do think, and indeed claim to have shown, that there are also logical situations in 
which a rigorous statement of the nature of uncertainty in our uncertain inferences is expressible not in 
terms of probability, but in terms of likelihood, a quantity which does not obey to these laws” (Fisher to 
Jeffreys, 26 February 1934). 
21Fisher, who generally underrated Keynes’s work, namely his book on probability theory, argued that 
“Keynes’s excellent phrase, as I have always thought it, ‘the degree of rational belief’, is not really well 
applied to the concept of mathematical probability, in its classical sense implying the possibility of 
verification by observations of frequency, but can be seen to be more appropriate to the more primitive 
type of inference represented by those tests of significance from which no statement of probability can be 
derived” (Fisher to E.B. Wilson, 8 August 1956). 
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Neyman and Pearson: “The absence of reference to experience seems to me a serious 
flaw in their work”.22 
 
2.1.3. Fisher’s criticism of Neyman’s and Pearson’s theory of hypotheses 
testing 
 
Fisher conceived statistical research as the production of a direct probability statement 
for the limited class of cases for which that would be possible. The statement refers to 
the determination of the p-value, the test statistics being compared to its known 
distribution under Ho being true, and attributing to the researcher a decision on rejection 
or acceptance based upon experience (Fisher, 1922). Although Fisher loudly prevented 
the misinterpretation of p-values as error probabilities – as the obtained value of p is a 
function of a single data set –, Neyman criticised this approach as a violation of the 
frequencist principle and, at least at first, he conceived his own effort as an attempt to 
correct and extend this method to the choice of an efficient test based on a precise 
axiomatic and allowing for an objective protocol of acceptance or rejection.23 But it 
soon became obvious that both Fisher and Neyman understood the divergence 
separating their investigations and theoretical foundations. Jeffreys, on the other hand, 
sharply rejected the use of p-values, arguing that a true hypothesis could eventually be 
rejected for not predicting values not having occurred (Jeffreys, 1961). 
 
On the other hand, for Fisher, the Neyman-Pearson technology was unsound essentially 
given that the level of significance could not be defined as a relative frequency of 
repeated sampling from the same population: as his biographer stated, “the sampling 
property of confidence intervals (…) says nothing at all about the probability of θ given 
the result of the one particular sample of data actually obtained” (Joan Fisher, 1978: 
451). Three reasons contributed to this denial. First, there is no opportunity for repeated 
sampling, because the values of the ancillary statistics cannot be fixed from one sample 
to the other simply given the fact that the population – or the reference set – changes 
from sample to sample. Second, the evidence against the null does not necessarily 
                                                 
22 Fisher to C.I. Bliss, 6 October 1938. 
23 As previously argued, Neyman and Pearson at first saw their contribution as a refinement of Fisher’s, 
although he took the opposite view, rejecting what he thought to be just an acceptance procedure similar 
to the control quality tests, leading to a distortion of the logic of inference: “I can now understand, much 
better than before, the early work of Neyman, or Neyman and Pearson, in the light of what you said the 
other afternoon, for it now seems clear to me, as it did not before, that Neyman, thinking all the time of 
acceptance procedures, was under the misapprehension that my own work on estimation had only the 
same end in view” (Fisher to Barnard, 9 February 1954). 
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match the relative frequency with which that p-value is attained (Johnstone, 1987: 
492).24 Third, Fisher pointed out a logical difficulty: if the true hypothesis is 
unspecifiable, it is immaterial to define the error of the second kind relative to the 
alternative hypothesis. Consequently, the sampling approach fails: 
 
There is a great deal in the approach chosen by Neyman and Pearson that I 
disagree with, but so far it seems to have led to nothing more than the conclusion 
that the tests of significance which I and those who agree with me had 
previously put forward were the best possible for their purposes (…). It is 
however, in my opinion, a pity that these writers have introduced the concept of 
‘errors of the second kind’, i.e. of accepting an hypothesis when it is false, 
seeing that until the true hypothesis is specified, such errors are undefined both 
in magnitude and in frequency. (Fisher to Deming, 19 September 1935) 
 
For Fisher, the null hypothesis simply cannot be considered true only because it failed 
to be contradicted, and the notion of the error of the second kind is incomputable 
whenever it depends on an unknown alternative. 
 
Furthermore, Fisher strongly favoured applied research against mathematical 
abstractions and, namely, he rejected statistics to be part of deductive reasoning. In this 
he differed from Neyman: “Fisher was a research scientist using mathematical skills, 
Neyman a mathematician applying mathematical concepts to experimentation” (Joan 
Fisher, 1978: 265). 
 
Other authors developed this discussion, suggesting that the logical mode of reasoning 
implied in Neyman’s and Pearson’s approach leads to the fallacy of denying the 
consequent, since obtaining atypical data under a certain hypothesis is no proof of the 
falsity of that hypothesis. Otherwise, the significance test under the null is not enough 
evidence for the hypothesis. 
                                                 
24 The following example is given by Spielman: “The size of a test is the maximum relative frequency of 
erroneous rejections of the hypothesis tested among all members of the reference class, whereas the 
reliability of a negative diagnosis is determined by the relative frequency of erroneous rejections among 
those members of the reference class for which a rejection will occur. Those values can be radically 
different. It would be as stupid to regard one minus the size of a test as indicating the reliability of the test 
for rejection of the hypothesis tested as it would be for a male American of age fifty who has had a major 
coronary attack to regard the proportion of all fifty-year-old American males who will suffer a fatal 
coronary prior to their fifty-first birthday as indicating his chance of having a fatal coronary prior to his 
fifty-first birthday” (Spielman, 1973: 209). 
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The notions of size and power became the focus of much attention. Gill suggests they 
are contradictory: “Note that α and β are probabilities conditional on two mutually 
exclusive events: α is conditional on the null hypothesis being true, and β is conditional 
on the null hypothesis being false” (Gill, 1999: 651), whereas Spielman recapitulates an 
example by Neyman to argue that these concepts may be misleading and concurring to 
wrong decisions, and are therefore irrelevant as decision tools (Spielman, 1973: 202, 
215). Consequently, these authors support Fisher's rejection of the Neyman-Pearson 
approach as unsuited for a theory of inference (Seidenfeld, 1979: 47).  
 
Nevertheless, when he had presented his own alternative to Bayesian inverse 
probability, Fisher defined a confidence interval approach as part of the concept of 
fiducial probability.25 In the early 1930s, most statisticians regarded fiducial probability 
and Neyman’s confidence intervals as synonymous (Zabell, 1992: 371-3). Bartlett, a 
supporter of the Neymanian approach, argued that fiducial intervals are a particular case 
of confidence intervals, under a frequencist interpretation (Bartlett, 1965: 395). It is 
certainly obvious that afterwards, for polemic reasons as well as for deep convictions on 
the nature of statistics, Fisher rejected both the confidence intervals approach and its 
theoretical assumptions on the nature of frequencism, since evidence from the data 
should not be confused with a limit of actual frequencies but should be thought of as a 
frequency from the imagined population as well as a measure of rational belief. In this 
sense, the difference opposing Fisher and Neyman stood as philosophical questions on 
the essence of statistical inference. Whereas for Neyman probability was defined as the 
“idealization of long-run frequency in a long sequence of repetitions under constant 
conditions” (Lehmann, 1993: 1245), for Fisher the concept was ambiguous. 
Furthermore, for practical purposes, Fisher generally opposed the choice of fixed levels 
of significance for a decision procedure, therefore transformed into acceptance rules, a 
notion Pearson attributed to Neyman (Lehmann, 1993: 1244). 
 
These differences opposing both camps confronted the inductive behaviour, solely 
based on deduction and theory of probability, against inductive inference, respectively 
championed by Neyman and by Fisher.  
 
                                                 
25 Fiducial probability, as an alternative to the Bayesian concept of inverse inference based on prior 
probabilities, was Fisher’s “most controversial proposal”, and it proved to be “invalid” (Seidenfeld, 1979: 
3, 105, 219). 
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2.2. The second difference: statistics as a tool for refutation 
 
The value of statistical propositions has always been a mystery for a number of 
prestigious scientists. That was certainly the case in the period of emergence of statistics 
as the science of measurement and inference. One curious instance of that perplexity is 
the refrain of the song the director of Rothamstead wrote for the Christmas party of 
1928:  
 
“Statistics, you see, is a wondrous cult 
For a non-mathematical mind, 
Which wants but the final, or end result –  
As to how its attained is quite blind” 
 
The paradox in this blind process of a wondrous cult, the song went, was the importance 
of the error, a bizarre event only someone versed in statistics would be able to tame: as 
another verse assured, “Fisher can always allow for it” (Joan Fisher, 1978: 138-9). What 
to make of statements proved by error was in any case a matter of dispute among 
statisticians. 
 
Indeed, if the first difference between Fisher and Neyman-Pearson concerns the logic of 
inference, the second is complementary if not derived from that and concerns the very 
nature of the statistical propositions. What they discussed was not at all trivial, since it 
provided an anticipation of the crucial confrontations in the twentieth-century 
epistemology on the nature of inference.  
 
When it came to rationalize the practice of statistics, the Hypothetico-Deductive model 
was offered as a norm: it establishes a set of hypotheses and deduces a prediction out of 
them in order to be tested against the facts, asking then for confirmation (propounded by 
the Vienna Circle and Carnap) or, as it became the accepted view, for refutation (as 
suggested by Karl Popper). A disciple of Popper, Imre Lakatos, praised Neyman’s and 
Pearson’s test of hypothesis as “rest[ing] completely on methodological 
falsificationism” (Lakatos, 1978: 25), although the fact is that they developed their 
methodology independently and previously to Popper. Others emphasise, more 
rigorously, that the Fisherian test of significance is closer to Popperian falsificationism, 
since the null hypothesis can only be refuted (Gigerenzer et al 1989: 96), although also 
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in this case the concept was established well before Popper published his 1935 magnum 
opus.26 
 
In fact, Fisher used the principle of refutation as an argument against his opponents, 
although he was at times ambiguous on the value of confirmation. What in any case it 
obvious is that Neyman fully endorsed a logic of confirmation, which was embedded in 
the choice of the most powerful test and in the concept of test of alternatives since “the 
numerical values of probabilities of errors of the second kind are most useful for 
deciding whether or not the failure of a test to reject a given hypothesis could be 
interpreted as any sort of ‘confirmation’ of this hypothesis” (Neyman, 1956: 290). 
Therefore, Neyman’s approach is alien to Popperianism, which would question the 
mechanics of acceptance of whatever alternative hypothesis as a consequence of the 
rejection of the null. 
 
Fisher rejected this approach: typically, he argued that “every experiment may be said 
to exist only to give the facts a chance of disproving the null hypothesis” (Fisher, 1935: 
16). This radical claim was reiterated by Fisher on several occasions. One of such was a 
debate in the pages of Nature with the aged Karl Pearson, which was ignited by a letter 
by an applied scientist, John Buchanan-Wollaston, on the irrelevance of tests. 
Buchanan-Wollaston argued that one cannot test simultaneously “untruth on one 
hypothesis and the truth of the reverse hypothesis” (Inman, 1994: 3), and Fisher used 
the opportunity to tackle the Neyman-Pearson approach:   
 
It would, therefore, add greatly to the clarity with which the tests of significance 
are regarded if it were generally understood that tests of significance, when used 
accurately, are capable of rejecting or invalidating hypotheses, in so far as these 
are contradicted by the data; but that they are never capable of establishing them 
as certainly true. In fact the ‘errors of the second kind’ are committed only by 
those who misunderstood the nature and application of tests of significance. 
(quoted in Inman, 1994: 5) 
 
Karl Pearson was also totally at odds with his son Egon, since his positivism radically 
prevented the acceptance of any claim of truth related to the hypothesis. In that he was 
                                                 
26 Another peculiarity of this dispute on the attribution of Popperian credentials to any of the contenders is 
that Popper himself considered Darwinism to be a metaphysical theory and therefore non-scientific, 
which would exclude Fisher from considerations. 
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followed by Fisher: not rejecting the null does not establish its truth. But Karl Pearson 
was more radical than Fisher, since he considered that even rejection was restricted to 
the strange case of zero probability: “There is only one case in which a hypothesis can 
be definitely rejected, namely when its probability is zero” (quoted in Inman, 1994: 7). 
Therefore, except in this case, anything goes. 
 
In this polemics with Neyman and Egon Pearson via Karl Pearson, R.A. Fisher attacked 
another assumption of the strategy of tests of hypotheses, its sampling interpretation, the 
condition for an acceptance procedure in a decision framework. Instead, Fisher 
proposed a nonsampling interpretation of the level of significance: the determination of 
a level of 0.05 does not imply that the investigator will be deceived once in twenty 
occasions.  
 
The different interpretations of the meaning of a significance level opposed Fisher 
(interpreting the result as that of an individual test rather than of sequences of tests) and 
Neyman-Pearson (establishing the size and power of the test as derived from a series of 
similar tests). Furthermore, since the population is imaginary, the provisional 
conclusion is referred to the test and not to reality itself. In that, he distanced from 
Popper, who asked for refutation grounded on experimental evidence for a realistic 
conclusion. For Fisher, the whole procedure was only a matter of scientific attitude: 
 
 
What is particularly troublesome is that Neyman, in importing from Eastern 
Europe his misconceptions as to the nature of scientific research, should have 
chosen so ubiquitous a scientific tool as the test of significance as the subject on 
which to fasten ideas relevant only to the acceptance procedure. A typical test of 
significance is based on a probability statement derived from the hypothesis to 
be tested, and therefore existing only in the hypothetical world created by this 
hypothesis. Typically it leads to no probability statement in the real world, but to 
a change in the investigator’s attitude towards the hypothesis under 
consideration, for which if we choose to use the word ‘rejection’ we must 
remember that the rejection is only provisional, and that our hypothetical 
calculations have shown that there would be a finite probability of our obtaining 
the observed level of significance even were the hypothesis true.” (Fisher to N. 
Keyfitz, 21 November 1955) 
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Contradictorily and in certain occasions, Fisher indulged in the acceptance of a 
provisional confirmation: “if the observations are such that with reasonable probability 
they might have arisen on the hypothesis under test, this hypothesis, though not proved, 
has at least so far been confirmed, and, pending further and more stringent observations, 
may be accepted” (Fisher, 1951: 36-7). 
 
Refuting or provisionally accepting the hypothesis, Fisher’s approach established that “a 
significance test does not permit one to assign any specific degree of probability to the 
hypothesis” and that only in specific cases can the uncertainty of the hypothesis be 
expressed in probabilistic terms (Gigerenzer et al 1989: 93). In this framework, the test 
of significance tests the null for plausibility, measuring the deviations of observations, 
even if it is an unsettled question to know “if a significance level is a meaningful 
measure for discrepancy” (ibid.: 94). This is why Fisher adhered to the Keynesian 
notion of the “degree of rational belief” as a condition for inference in those cases in 
which no statement of frequencist probability could be derived: finally and in general, it 
would be up to the researcher, considering his knowledge and wisdom, to formulate his 
own intuition on the statistical evidence from the experiment, and no technology could 
substitute the experience of the experimenter. 
 
2.3. The third difference: the concept of model and experiment 
 
The notion of a statistical model was introduced by Fisher in 1922, with the paper “On 
the Mathematical Foundations of Theoretical Statistics”. It refined the concept of 
variables and parameters and established the distinction between sample and population, 
defining the hypothetical infinite population. The subsequent work on statistics built on 
these definitions. 
 
Neyman and Pearson initially shared this definition of the model, although suggesting a 
confirmationist interpretation of the results of the test: 
 
A model is a set of invented assumptions regarding invented entities such that, if 
one treats these invented entities as representations of appropriate elements of 
the phenomena studied, the consequences of the hypotheses constituting the 
model are expected to agree with observations. If, in all relevant trials, the 
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degree of conformity appears to us satisfactory, then we consider the model an 
adequate model. (Neyman, 1957: 8) 
 
What differenced Neyman and Fisher on the function of the model was the eventual 
incorporation of a decision framework as part of the definition of the test itself. For 
Neyman, the description of the model was reinterpreted in a behaviouristic framework 
and hypothesis testing was therefore part of a reiterated process, similar to quality 
control sampling, in order to establish the optimal procedure. In that sense, for Neyman 
the logic of inference emancipated from the notion of the hypothetical population 
(Lenhard, 2006).  
 
Fisher rejected this concept of a behaviouristic approach to modelling and considered it 
was a consequence of alienation from the practical needs of applied research and 
explained the suport gained by Neyman: “I do not of course say, or, I hope, seem to 
imply, that in all mathematical departments the Neyman fog has settled in, but that it 
has settled in only in those departments which are insulated from practical research in 
the Natural Sciences” (Fisher to Barnard, 8 May 1961). Instead, he favoured a common 
sense approach to decision in testing: 
 
I am a little sorry that you have been worrying yourself at all with that 
unnecessary portentous approach to tests of significance represented by the 
Neyman and Pearson critical regions, etc. In fact, I and my pupils through the 
world would never think of using them. If I am asked to give an explicit reason 
for this I should say they approach the problem entirely from the wrong end, i.e. 
not from the point of view of a research worker, with a basis of well grounded 
knowledge on which a very fluctuating population of conjectures and incoherent 
observations is continually under examination. What he needs is a confident 
answer to the question ‘Ought I to take notice of that?’. This question can, of 
course, and for refinement of thought should, be framed as ‘Is this particular 
hypothesis overthrown, and if so at what level of significance, by this particular 
body of observations?’. It can be put in this form unequivocally only because the 
genuine experimenter already has the answers to all the questions that the 
followers of Neyman and Pearson attempt, I think vainly, to answer by merely 
mathematical considerations. (Fisher to W.E. Hick, 8 October 1951, my italics) 
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2.4. Hybridization  
 
The final result of the widest cleft is to be established. What is certainly obvious is that 
the quarrel is essentially ignored in contemporary statistical theorising and that the 
practical workers indistinctively apply tools derived from one or the other of the 
contending camps, for instance the notion of the power of the test and that of 
significance. As Keuzenkamp and Magnus refer in relation to econometrics:  
 
Testing hypotheses belongs to the basic pastimes of econometricians. It is a 
compulsory topic in any course in introductory statistics and econometrics. In 
such a course, students are made familiar with notions like Type I and Type II 
errors, significance levels, and power. This is firmly in the tradition of statistical 
testing along the lines proposed by Jerzy Neyman and Egon Pearson. However, 
econometric practice seems closer to the approach of Sir R.A. Fisher, although 
he is rarely mentioned (apart from references to the F-test). (Keuzenkamp and 
Magnus, 1995: 6) 
 
This is the result of what Gigerenzer and his co-authors named hybridization, the 
synthesis established in spite of the cleft and reconciling the points of view the original 
authors considered irreconcilable (Gigerenzer et al., 1989: 106 f.). Hybridization is a 
strategy of maximizing the benefits from both approaches, considering Neyman-
Pearson’s more suited for evaluation of the costs of alternative options, but less suited 
for scientific inference. Consequently, hybridization suggests a forest of interpretative 
deviations: “The researcher must specify the level of significance before conducting the 
experiment (following Neyman and Pearson rather than Fisher); he must not draw 
conclusions from a non-significant result (following Fisher’s writings, but not Neyman-
Pearson); and so on. Neyman’s behavioristic interpretation did not become part of the 
hybrid, and Type I and Type II errors are given an epistemic interpretation. This has led 
to an enormous confusion about the meaning of a significance level” (ibid.: 107). 
 
Confusion and personal bias, since, furthermore, it is accepted that all statistical 
alternatives require doubtful choices tainted with subjectivism: Fisher arbitrarily 
chooses the model and the test, Neyman and Pearson the class of hypotheses and the 
rejection region and the Bayesians the a priori probability (ibid.: 101, 105). 
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As a consequence, hybridization evolved to several attempts to correct subjectivism 
through the establishment of rigid protocols in testing. Berger suggested a conditional 
error probabilities approach, following Fisher rather than Neyman (Berger, 2003), and 
Lenhard suggested John Tukey’s exploratory data analysis as a convenient synthesis 
(Lenhard, 2006). Lehmann, a disciple of Neyman, also battled for a unified approach, 
suggesting avoiding the omission of power (in Fisher’s strategy) and the omission of 
conditioning (in Neyman-Pearson’s; Lehmann, 1993: 1247). None of these was 
imposed as the authoritative synthesis in statistics and, as a consequence, hybridization 





Modern statistics went through many great advancements: the extension of probability 
from games of chance to the concept of measurement and the further extension to the 
concept of nature itself. As a consequence, by the end of the nineteenth century 
statistics was reshaped by biology, engaged as it was in modelling variation and not so 
much in reducing error (Gigerenzer et al, 1989: 68). Karl Pearson and Ronald A. Fisher 
emerged as the constructors of modern statistics as they were both experimentally and 
theoretically involved in the explanation of variation, first under biometrics and then 
under the statistical exploration in the Darwin-Mendel synthesis. 
 
The empirical foundation of biology favoured the adoption of a frequencist approach, 
but it was inside this camp that the wildest cleft developed opposing Fisherian tests of 
significance and concept of likelihood to the Neyman-Pearson theory of tests of 
hypotheses. The cleft distinguished between concepts of probability, concepts of sample 
and population, concepts of inference and as consequence the concepts of the tests 
themselves. Both contenders clearly defined their theories in the field they proceeded 
from: for Fisher, postulating an infinite hypothetical population was trivial, since the 
extraction of a small sample of biological entities was not supposed to change the nature 
of the population, whereas for the mathematically abstract entities defined by Neyman 
the probability could be conceived of as the frequency of successive sample extractions 
from the same population. 
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For economists, instead, none of the concepts apply trivially and that was the reason for 
so much resistance and miscomprehension. For in any realistic economic context, 
repeated extractions are not independent given time-dependency and, furthermore, there 
is not a stable population through time given structural change. Haavelmo addressed 
this problem suggesting a meta-historical view of a supra-population of “histories”, and 
read this as the incorporation of the repeated sampling approach in order to sustain the 
applicability of Neyman-Pearson’s theory. In this sense, he hybridized the available but 
contradictory theories in statistics.  
 
The consequence was that economic variables were themselves to be reconsidered as 
stochastic processes, if this narrative were coherent. But the price for this is high 
enough and it was not unperceived by the contemporary economists, since this requires 
the abandonment of strict determinism: economics could not any more be written as the 
exploration in mechanical determination, in finding laws of behaviour and of action and 
consequence, but should instead consist in the description of laws of distribution and the 
determination of probabilities derived from them. It does not come as a surprise that this 
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